Dispensing Birth Control in Public Schools: Do

Parents Have A Right To Know?
Marcia Mobilia Boumil *
I.

INTRODUCTION

With the rise of unwanted, adolescent pregnancies reaching
epidemic proportions, some public high schools have reacted by
sponsoring family planning clinics which dispense birth control
devices to minors without notifying parents or obtaining their
consent. Many parents are outraged with this practice. Traditionally, constitutional principles governing fundamental privacy
rights guarantee parents the right to the care, custody and education of their minor children.' Thus, parents view the lack of notification or consent requirements as a usurpation of their
traditional roles. Furthermore, constitutional rights of privacy
have been extended to mature, emancipated minors in connection with their decisions to engage in sexual activity, to have an
abortion, and to obtain contraceptives. 2 Family planning services
provided by school sponsored clinics have received wide-spread
attention. As of this writing, courts have not yet addressed the
issue of whether this practice may be challenged by parents on
the basis of a violation of their constitutional rights to the care
and management of their children.
* B.S., M.S., Tufts University; J.D. University of Connecticut School of Law,
LL.M., Columbia University School of Law.
I See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) ("recognizing that
values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society"); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (recognizing Constitutional protection of
parents' rights "to direct the rearing of their children"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing parents rights "to direct the upbringing
and education of children"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing that fourteenth amendment guarantees the right "to marry, establish a home
and bring up children"). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 40-53 and
accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduction Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407-08 (1981);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979); Carey v. Population Services Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (all holding that minors have a right to demonstrate their
maturity to make decisions with respect to obtaining abortions or contraceptives
before the state imposes parental consent requirements). See also infra text accompanying notes 55-78 for a discussion of these cases.
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In 1982 and 1983, several courts addressed a legal challenge
to Title X,s an amendment to the Public Health Service Act.4 In
1983, the Department of Health and Human Services implemented Title X by promulgating regulations requiring federally
funded family planning clinics to notify parents or guardians of
unemancipated minors when prescription contraceptive devices
were distributed to their children. 5 Cases, however, such as New
York v. Schweiker 6 and Planned Parenthood Federation of America v.
Schweiker 7 (Planned Parenthood) rejected the argument that under
Title X the federal government could mandate that federally
funded family planning clinics notify parents or guardians of minor children to whom prescription birth control devices were
distributed.
The clinics argued persuasively that the notification requirement would deter sexually active adolescents from seeking medically supervised services to obtain contraceptives.' Additionally,
they argued that forcing disclosure of sensitive physician-patient
information would breach the guarantee of confidentiality made
to the minor recipients of the clinical services. 9 By declining to
3 Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-572, 84 Stat. 1506 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1982)).
4 Public Health Service Act of 1944, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1982)).
5 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(12) (1983) (superseded 42 C.F.R. § 59.5 (1984)). The
regulation provided that Title X clinics must:
(12) Encourage, to the extent practical, family participation in the
provision of the project's services to unemancipated minors. Notwithstanding any other requirement of this subpart, a project shall,

(ii) Where State law requires the notification or consent of a parent or guardian to the provision of family planning services to an individual who is an unemancipated minor under State law, provide such
services only in the compliance with such law.
Id. Subsequent to court determinations rejecting the notice regulations, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a final rule removing subsection 12
in its entirety from governing requirements for family planning projects. See 42
C.F.R. § 59.5 (1984).
6 557 F. Supp. 354, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
7 559 F. Supp. 658, 668 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Federation
of America, Inc. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
8 In Planned Parenthood,the clinics submitted studies and affidavits which clearly
indicated that the regulations would deter minors from seeking services from the
clinics and would result in an increase in unwanted pregnancies. 559 F. Supp. at
663-64. The clinic physicians in Schweiker presented the same argument and added
that without the benefit of Title X services sexually transmitted diseases could not
be prevented, detected or treated. 557 F. Supp. at 358-59.
9 The family services clinics argued: "[Clonfidentiality is not only part of the
professional responsibility of the health care professionals .... This duty has been
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enforce the notification provision, a clinic risked forfeiting federal grants and consequent curtailment of its operations. The
clinics maintained that the element of confidentiality was just as
essential to their operation as federal funding, and without such
privacy they could not function effectively.' °
The clinics' arguments were compelling. The language of
Title X evidences a congressional intent to encourage family
planning and participation in Title X programs." In devising
such legislation, Congress presumably understood that privacy
and confidentiality were essential to the success of these clinics.
An unresolved issue was whether "family planning and participation" should be interpreted to include parents of unemancipated
adolescents who seek the services of these clinics.
This article will explore the question of whether parents
could wage a successful legal challenge against public schools
which operate clinics that dispense birth control devices to children without notifying their parents. The issue will be addressed
in light of amendments proposed in 1983 to the federal regulations implementing Title X of the Public Health Service Act and
in the context of such cases as Planned Parenthood and Schweiker
which struck down the notification requirement. Included in a
discussion of case law will be a review of certain family privacy
right cases which considered the practical consequences that
might have resulted from imposing a notification requirement.
Finally, the article will balance the competing interests of parents
and children and conclude with arguments which may assist parents in implementing a notification requirement in the absence of
specific legislation.
long recogrized as inviolate by the clinics, particularly with respect to sensitive information such as a patient's decision about sexuality or contraceptives." Planned
Parenthood,559 F. Supp. at 666.
10 See id. at 665; Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 360.
I1 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1982). Under the section governing grants for family
planning services, subsection (a) provides:
The Secretary is authorized to make grants to and enter into contracts
with the public or non-profit private entities to assist in the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall
offer a broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods
and services (including natural family planning methods, infertility services, and services for adolescents). To the extent practical, entities
which receive grants or contracts under this subsection shall encourage
familiy (sic) participation in projects assisted under this subsection.
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BACKGROUND OF TITLE X

On July 1, 1944, Congress enacted the Public Health Service
Act to establish a system of funding for the research, prevention
and treatment of, and education relating to physical and mental
diseases. 12 In 1970, Congress amended the Public Health Service Act by adding Title X which established a nationwide family
planning program. This amendment, entitled the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act (Title X), was.
promulgated to promote public health and welfare by coordinating and making available a comprehensive program of voluntary
family planning services.' 3 Under Title X, Congress expressly
authorized the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
and subsequently the Department of Health and Human Services
(Agency) ' 4 "to make grants to and enter into contracts with public or non-profit private entities" that would provide a broad
15
range of family planning services.
Over the years, several amendments were added to Title X,
one of which was the 1981 amendment which provided that "to
12 Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, § 301, 58 Stat. 682, 691-92 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 241 (a) (1982)). More specifically, the Act provides:
(a) The Secretary shall conduct in the Service, and encourage, cooperate with, and render assistance to other appropriate public authorities, scientific institutions, and scientists in the conduct of, and promote
the coordination of, research, investigations, experiments, demonstrations, and studies relating to the causes, diagnosis, treatment, control,
and prevention of physical and mental diseases and impairments of
man....

42 U.S.C. § 241(a) (1982). Under this subsection, the term "Secretary" refers to
the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id. § 201(c). In its original enactment, the Act delegated to the Surgeon General, under the supervision of the Federal Security Administrator, the authority to implement the Act. See ch. 373,
§§ 201, 301, 58 Stat. 583, 691-92 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 202
(1982)). However, pursuant to President Lyndon B. Johnson's 1966 Reorganization Plan, functions performed by the Surgeon General were transferred to the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1966, 3 C.F.R.
191-92 (1966), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. app. at 46 (1982) and 80 Stat. 1610 (1966). A
later amendment substituted the "Surgeon General" designation with "Secretary."
Act of Nov. 9, 1978, Pub. L. 95-622, 92 Stat. 3434 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 241 (1982)).
In 1979, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was renamed the
Department of Health and Human Services. Act of Oct. 17, 1979, Pub. L. No. 9688, 93 Stat. 695 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (1982)). Thus, today, the
Public Health Service Act is implemented by regulations of the Department of
Health and Human Services.
'3 Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-572, 84 Stat. 1506 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1982)).
14 See supra note 12.
15 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1982).
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the extent practical, entities which receive grants or contracts
under this subsection shall encourage familiy (sic) participation in
projects assisted under this subsection." 16 In 1982, the Agency
proposed regulations to implement the 1981 amendment.' 7 The
proposed regulations provided that clinics receiving federal
funding would be required to notify parents or guardians within
ten days after dispensing contraceptive drugs or devices to unemancipated minors. The proposed regulations also purported
to redefine the statutory phrase "low-income family" by removing the requirement that clinics evaluate the financial eligibility of
a minor on the basis of a minor's own resources. Thus, "need"
would be defined on the basis of parents' financial status. The
Agency adopted the proposed regulations.' 8 Shortly thereafter,
this regulatory action became the subject of litigation. Clinics
would argue that the required disclosure of parental resources
was tantamount to a de facto notification requirement.
III.

LITIGATION CHALLENGING TITLE X NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS

The Agency's newly adopted regulations were challenged
promptly in different federal district courts by Title X grantees in
Planned Parenthood and Schweiker. Decided only days apart, these
cases arose out of remarkably similar factual circumstances.' 9 In
both cases, the courts
granted the respective plaintiffs' requests
20
for injunctive relief.
Planned Parenthood involved consolidated actions brought by
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. and its member
affiliates and The National Family Planning and Reproductive
Health Association, Inc. against the Department of Health and
Human Services and its then Secretary, Richard Schweiker. 2 1 In
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the
plaintiffs argued that the regulatory promulgations exceeded
statutory authority and undermined "congressional intent of ar16 See Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970 Pub. L. No.
91-572, § 6, 84 Stat. 1506.
17 42 C.F.R. § 59 (1983).
I8 Id.

19 In Planned Parenthood, preliminary injunctive relief was granted on February
18, 1983 and a final order was handed down on March 2, 1983. 559 F. Supp. at
660. In Schweiker preliminary injunctive relief was granted on February 14, 1983.
557 F. Supp. at 356.
20 See Planned Parenthood, 559 F. Supp. at 669-70; Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 36263.
21 PlannedParenthood, 559 F. Supp. at 661.
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resting the epidemic of teenage pregnancies. 2 To this end, Title X required its grantees to respect their patients'
confidentiality. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the notification requirements were arbitrary and capricious. Lastly, the
plaintiffs argued that the regulations violated minors' constitutional rights to receive Title X family planning services.23
In Schweiker, an action was brought against Secretary
Schweiker by the State of New York, the New York State Department of Health, the Medical and Health Research Association of
New York City, Inc. (MHRA), and private physicians who were
authorized to implement Title X services. Appearing before the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, the plaintiffs in Schweiker challenged the constitutionality of
the Agency's regulatory provisions. Specifically, they alleged that
the parental notification requirements contravened Congress' intent to ensure the availability of Title X services to adolescents.2"
Furthermore, these requirements would force Title X grantees to
breach their duty of patient confidentiality. Moreover, the plaintiffs challenged the regulations as constitutionally violative of minors' rights to privacy and equal protection.25
In defense of the government's proposed regulations in both
actions, Secretary Schweiker challenged the plaintiffs' contentions that implementation of the proposed regulations was contrary to the congressional intent of encouraging use of family
service clinics because it would deter sexually active minors from
using such clinics and obtaining contraceptive devices. In
Planned Parenthood,the Secretary argued that the notification requirement would not necessarily deter minors from going to
these clinics.26 He also argued that to the extent that it did, minors could nonetheless obtain prescription devices elsewhere,
use non-prescription methods of birth control or abstain from
sexual activity. Moreover, in Schweiker, the Secretary maintained
that use of the word "encourage" in the legislation mandating
that clinics "shall encourage family participation" in Title X proId. at 668 (citing 124 CONG. REC. 37,044 (1978)).
Id. at 669.
Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 357.
Id.
Planned Parenthood, 559 F. Supp. at 663. The Secretary's argument was made
in the context of his challenge to the standing of the minors to bring the action.
The Secretary argued that the injury was speculative, as minors might not be deterred or could seek alternative sources of birth control. Thus, he concluded that
the regulations would not cause an increase in unwanted teenage pregnancies and
therefore the minors were without sufficient injury to establish standing. Id.
22
23
24
25
26
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grams reflected Congressional intent that participants involve
their families in decisions concerning the use of contraceptive devices. 27 The Secretary argued that the amendment would be a
"nullity" if its language was not construed to impose a parental
notice requirement, and further, encouraging parental participation was impossible without a parental notice requirement. Furthermore, the Secretary argued that "the notice requirement
28
[did] not mandate family involvement, it just facilitat[ed] it."

Additionally, Secretary Schweiker asserted that a minor's
confidentiality would not be compromised by the proposed regulations. Quite simply, the Secretary argued that minors would
waive that privilege as a condition of services. Therefore, Secrethere was "no guarantee of confitary Schweiker concluded that
9
2
dentiality to be breached."

The response of the federal courts was sharp and unequivocal. The Planned Parenthood and Schweiker courts each concluded

that the congressional intent behind Title X's 1981 amendment
did not mandate a parental notice requirement. 30 In both courts'
view, the Agency was not authorized to impose parental notification as a condition to receiving Title X services.
In response to the Secretary's contention that notification
need not be characterized as a breach of confidentiality, the
Planned Parenthoodcourt stated that disclosure of sensitive physician-patient information pursuant to a waiver, certain to have
been obtained under coercive circumstances, would inherently
violate the recipient's right of confidentiality. 3 ' Additionally, the
court rejected the Secretary's claim that the phrase "shall encourage family participation" mandated parental notification.
The court stated that "[t]he Secretary attempt[ed] to avoid the
plain language of the statute by engaging in a process of statutory construction by selective underlining.' '32
27 See Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 361 (citing Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1982)).
28 Id. (emphasis deleted) These notice regulations were reasonable, the Secretary argued, because they limited the parental notification requirement to the use
of prescription contraceptives in an area "where parental involvement is most
needed because of the documented side effects" related to their use. Id.
29 Planned Parenthood, 559 F. Supp. at 666.
30 See Planned Parenthood, 559 F. Supp. at 667-68; Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 36162.
31 Planned Parenthood, 559 F. Supp. at 666.
32 Id. at 667. The Secretary maintained that the Act imposed a "non-discretionary duty" on the clinics to notify the parents of their minors' decision to seek Title
X services. Id. at 667-68. The district court responded:
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In a similar vein, the Schweiker court rejected the Secretary's
contention that parental notification was consistent with Title X's
1981 amendment which provided that program grantees "shall
encourage family participation. ' 3 3 Characterizing the Secretary's
argument as "nothing more than an exercise in mere sophistry,"
the court ruled that the legislative history of the 1981 amendment did not mandate parental or family participation, but rather
required that Title X grantees "encourage their clients to include
their families" in family planning decisionmaking.3 4 The court
postulated that had Congress intended to depart from this position, it would have done so expressly, either through Title X or
in its legislative history.
Finally, having decided that the parental notification requirement was invalid, the Planned Parenthoodand Schweiker courts also
determined that the regulation redefining a low income family,
which required that a minor's eligibility for services be based
upon the parents' income rather than a minor's own financial resources, must also fail. 3 5 The courts reasoned that a provision
requiring a minor to furnish parental financial information to establish her own eligibility would be inconsistent with the Act's
confidentiality provisions and itself tantamount to a notification
provision.
The Schweiker court also struck down this "parental notification requirement" as illegal because it would require the minor
seeking Title X services to obtain parental financial support.3 6
The Planned Parenthood court characterized the regulation as creating a "de facto parental notification requirement" and stated further that parents could prevent a minor from obtaining Title X
This court finds the Secretary's reading of the statute unpersuasive.
The word "shall" remains an auxiliary verb in that sentence, and is auxiliary to the non-mandatory word "encourage." Thus grantees are required to encourage family participation, but they cannot take definitive,
irrevocable steps that will invariably result in family participation in a
minor's family planning decision.
Id. at 668 (footnote omitted).
33 Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 361. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the Secretary's arguments).
34 Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 361.
35 Planned Parenthood, 559 F. Supp. at 669; Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 362. In
Schweiker the Secretary argued that under the prior regulations, most teenagers
could utilize Title X services regardless of family income, and consequently the
regulations discriminated against those who were genuinely in financial need.
Thus, the Secretary argued, the new regulations were merely intended to correct
the prior inequity. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 362.
36 Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. at 362.
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services merely by withholding payment for them.3 7

Accordingly, both the District Court for the District of Columbia in PlannedParenthoodand the District Court for the Southern District of New York in Schweiker granted plaintiffs' request
for injunctive relief and enjoined enforcement of the notice regulations.3 8 In its final order, the PlannedParenthoodcourt ruled that
the regulations exceeded the authority conferred upon the
Agency by Title X and struck down the parental notification requirement as invalid. On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the Planned Parenthood court's construction of the 1981
amendment as reflective of congressional intent.39
IV.

DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY PRIVACY RIGHTS

The United States Supreme Court has addressed issues relating to marriage, procreation, family relationships, contraception, child rearing and education, all of which fall under the
rubric of family privacy rights decisions. A broad spectrum of
Supreme Court decisions is indicative of an attempt to establish
37 Planned Parenthood,559 F. Supp. at 669.
38 See supra notes 19-20.
39 Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650,
655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The circuit court stated:
[T]here are indeed "compelling indications" that the Secretary had misconstrued Congress' intent in enacting the 1981 amendment to Title X.
Our own careful review of the language of the statute and its legislative
history makes it clear that these regulations not only violate Congress'
specific intent as to the issue of parental notification, but also undermine the fundamental purposes of the Title X program.
Id. at 655-56. In affirming the district court's interpretation of the Act, the court of
appeals stated:
Certainly the use of the word "shall" presumptively implies some type
of mandatory obligation on grantees. But the nature of that obligation
is defined by the word "encourage." As the District Court noted, Congress' choice of this permissive and non-obligatory term is in itself revealing. Had Congress intended to mandate parental involvement, it
could easily have done so with more appropriate and less ambiguous
language such as "shall require family participation" or "shall notify the
family."
Indeed, the very concept of encouragement is further weakened by
the use of a qualifier "to the extent practical." While no specific content
may be given that phrase from the face of the statute, its use indicates
Congress' intent that the goal of encouraging family participation may
well have to give way to other, more practical considerations. Contrary
to appellant's assertions, then, the express language of the statute certainly does not lend support to the Secretary's interpretation of the
amendment as "reasonably contemplat[ing]" a parental notification
requirement.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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the parameters of parental rights with respect to parental involvement and discretion in child-rearing. A brief survey of
landmark cases illustrates a judicial deference to parental authority in the care and management of children, particularly in the
area of moral and educational upbringing.
For example, as early as the 1920's, the Supreme Court in
Meyer v. Nebraska4 referred to the fourteenth amendment's protection of an individual's right "to marry, establish a home and
bring up children."'" In Meyer, the state of Nebraska passed a law
forbidding the instruction of foreign language in any school in
the state unless the student had completed the eighth grade. The
Supreme Court held this law to be unconstitutional as a violation
of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause because it not
only deprived teachers of the liberty to teach, but it also removed
from parents the liberty to select teachers to instruct their
children .42
Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,4 3 the Court attempted to
extend the fourteenth amendment's protection to parental rights
by imposing limitations on the ability of the state to interfere
with child-rearing practices. The Court struck down an Oregon
compulsory education statute which effectively would have prohibited parents from sending their children to private or religious schools. The Court stated that "[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the [s]tate; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations."4 4 Forty-seven years
later, the Supreme Court characterized the Pierce decision as a
"charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbring45
ing of their children.
In Ginsberg v. New York, 46 the Supreme Court upheld a New
York statute prohibiting the sale of pornographic magazines to
minors under age seventeen.4 7 In addition to identifying an "independent [state] interest in the well-being of its youth," the
Ginsberg Court further justified the statutory restriction on
grounds that "constitutional interpretation has consistently rec262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 399.
See id. at 400.
43 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
44 Id. at 535.
45 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
46 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
47 Id. at 633.
40
41
42
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ognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society." 48 Thus, rather than disposing of Ginsberg solely on the strength of its state interest rationale, the Court
took the opportunity to specifically recognize parental authority
as a concept distinct from the parens patriae role of the state in
directing and protecting the upbringing of minor children.49
In 1972, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,5 the Supreme Court refused
to enforce the state's compulsory school attendance law against a
group of Amish parents. At issue in Yoder was the state's interest
in uniform compulsory formal secondary education, and its alleged encroachment on the rights of the Amish parents and their
children to practice their religious beliefs by avoiding exposure
to the outside world. In its opinion, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the "primary role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition."'" The Court, however, took great pains to
note that its decision, in its application, was limited to the Amish
whose "deep religious conviction ... [was] intimately related to

daily living. ' 52 Since the Court was not faced with the issue of an
Amishminor's desire to attend a public high school, it did not
address the competing interests of parents, their minor children
and the state.53
This brief survey of the constitutional commitment to parental authority highlights judicial recognition and protection of parents' claims to authority in the upbringing of their children.
Although the arguments concerning parental notification upon
dispensing birth control devices to minor children have not been
premised solely upon parental rights, a successful challenge
might be brought on that basis.
Id. at 639-40.
See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, where the Supreme
Court struck down an Illinois statute that discriminated against fathers of illegitimate children, the Court issued one of its strongest statements promoting parental
interests in the "companionship, care, custody and management, of [their] children." Id. at 651. Justice White stated that a parent's private interest in his child
"undeniably warrants deference, and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection." Id.
50 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
51 Id. at 232.
52 Id. at 216.
53 Id. at 231. Rather, the Court noted that their decision in Yoder "involve[d] the
fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the [s]tate, to guide the
religious future and education of their children." Id. at 232.
48

49
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RIGHTS OF MINORS

In decisions affecting procreation, the Supreme Court also
has recognized that minors as well as adults possess a constitutional right to privacy.54 In PlannedParenthoodof CentralMissouri v.
Danforth, 5 the United States Supreme Court in a plurality decision struck down a state statute which imposed a parental consent provision as a pre-requisite to the choice of an unmarried
minor to have an abortion. Justice Blackmun wrote that:
the [s]tate may not impose a blanket provision . . . requiring
the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition
for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks
of her pregnancy ....
[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly
arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the
reason for withholding the consent.5 6
Having extended a constitutional right of privacy to minors, the plurality recognized that the state might possess a broad power to regulate the activities of minors, but when this authority extended to
imposing parental consent provisions, it stood without sufficient justification.5
According to Justice Blackmun, the state's interest in
preserving the family unit and parental authority was not possible
with "such veto power" because the decisions of "the minor and the
nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very
existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family structure." 5 8 More importantly, the plurality dismissed any independent
parental interest in the decision to terminate the child's pregnancy
as "no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant."5 9 The plurality
qualified its decision by emphasizing that every minor might not be
capable of giving effective consent to an abortion. Nonetheless, the
blanket imposition of parental consent as a condition to the minor's
54 See Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987) (per curiam); City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 461 (1983); H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 55-78 for a

discussion of these cases.
55 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
56
57

Id. at 74 (Blackmun, J., plurality).
Id.

58 Id. at 75 (Blackmun, J., plurality).
59

Id.
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decision to terminate her pregnancy exceeded the state's authority,
and served no significant state interest.6"
Less than a year later, in Carey v. Population Services International 61 the Supreme Court invalidated a New York State statute
which prohibited the distribution or sale of contraceptives to minors
under sixteen years of age. In a plurality opinion, Justice Brennan
stated that since Danforth invalidated a blanket prohibition on a minor's right to choose to have an abortion, "the constitutionality of a
blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is
afortiori foreclosed." 6 2 The State of New York argued that minors
accessibility to contraceptives would contribute to an increase in
sexual activity among minors, and would therefore contravene the
state's policy of discouraging this behavior. Justice Brennan dismissed the state's argument as insignificant, adding that the deterrent effect of the state's policy was virtually non-existent. 6 3
In 1979, in Bellotti v. Baird,' the Supreme Court in a plurality
decision struck down a Massachusetts statute which prohibited a
physician from performing an abortion on a minor under the age of
eighteen without parental consent or, alternatively, where parental
consent is refused, by a court order. Reiterating the axioms of the
Danforth, Ginsberg and Pierce decisions, a plurality of the Court held
that the existing state regulation imposed an undue burden upon a
minor's right to decide to have an abortion. In Bellotti, Justice Powell recognized the state's interest in protecting immature minors but
concluded that in the presence of this type of statute, the state must
also provide an alternative proceeding whereby a minor can either
demonstrate her maturity to make an informed decision as to
whether to have an abortion, or despite her immaturity show that an
65
abortion would be in her best interest.
Two years later in H.L. v. Matheson,66 the Supreme Court upheld a Utah statute which imposed a conditional parental notifica60
61
62

See id.

431 U.S. 678 (1977).

Id. at 694 (Brennan, J., plurality).
Id. at 695 (Brennan, J., plurality). The plurality rejected the state's argument
as never having been taken seriously by any court or commentator. Id. at 694 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148 (1973)) (Brennan, J., plurality). Justice Brennan explained that: "It would be plainly unreasonable to assume that [the state]
has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child [or the physical and
psychological dangers of an abortion] as punishment for fornication." Id. (Brennan, J., plurality) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1971).
64 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
65 Id. at 643-44, 647-48 (Powell, J., plurality).
66 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
63
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tion requirement upon a physician prior to performing an abortion
on an unmarried minor. In Matheson, an unmarried, unemancipated
fifteen year old challenged the constitutionality of the statute asserting that it was overbroad in its application "to all unmarried minor
girls, including those who are mature and emancipated." 6 7 Declaring that she had failed to adequately demonstrate her maturity, the
Court refused to confer upon her the standing necessary to advance
her arguments. 68 Instead, the Court turned to a narrow issue:
the facial constitutionality of a statute requiring a physician to
give notice to parents, "if possible," prior to performing an
abortion on their minor daughter, (a) when the girl is living
with and dependent upon her parents, (b) when she is not
emancipated by marriage or otherwise, and (c) when she has
made no claim or showing as to her maturity or as to her relations with her parents.6 9
The Supreme Court upheld the statute in its application to this
particular class of minors because it served a significant state interest. In the Court's view, the statute did not give parents a blanket
veto power over their minor's decision to have an abortion. Due
regard, however, was given to the immature minor's inability to
make an informed decision, as well as to the parents' appropriate
"guiding role" in counseling their children on important decisions.70 Accordingly, the Court ruled that "a statute setting out a
,mere requirement of parental notice' does not violate the constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor."'"
In 1983, the Supreme Court in two companion cases, City of Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, Inc. 72 and Planned Parenthood
Association v. Ashcroft,73 addressed the constitutionality of statutory
regulations requiring a minor to procure parental consent before
obtaining an abortion. In Akron, the plurality invalidated the city
ordinance on the grounds that it failed to provide the minor with an
alternative procedure for demonstrating her maturity as advanced
by the Bellotti plurality."4 In Ashcroft, however, a plurality of the
Id. at 405.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 410 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-39 (1979)) (Powell, J.,
plurality)).
71 Id. at 409 (footnote omitted).
72 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
73 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
74 Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-42 (Powell, J., plurality) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443
67
68
69
70

U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (Powell, J., plurality)). See supra text accompanying note

65.
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Court upheld the state statute because it comported with the legal
standards established in Bellotti and Akron. 75 In a case of more recent vintage, Hartiganv. Zbaraz,76 the Supreme Court in a per curiam
decision affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute where the circuit court relied on the
well-settled principles concerning "parental consultation and notifi77
cation" as set forth in Danforth, Bellotti, Matheson, Akron and Ashcroft.

The Supreme Court has ruled, on more than one recent occasion, that although minors as well as adults have certain fundamental, constitutionally-protected civil rights, their ability to exercise
them is not unlimited. For example, in Danforth, the plurality recognized that not every minor is capable of giving an effective consent
for the termination of her pregnancy and thus may require parental
consultation in the decision. Yet it is also clear from the Danforth
decision that to the extent the minors can exercise them, fundamental privacy rights must be protected. The unresolved issue, however, concerns the strength of a minor's right of access to
contraception. If this right is "fundamental," the state must demonstrate a compelling interest to justify interference with reasonable
exercise of that right. Thus the issue is twofold: first, whether this
right is considered "fundamental" and second, if so, whether parental notification would violate the essential nature of that right. A fair
interpretation of Danforth compels one to concede that, with respect
to adults, privacy in the contraception decision is fundamental. Nevertheless, courts have limited minors' ability to exercise other fundamental rights such as the right to vote. In the same light, it is
arguable that even if a minor has a fundamental right to obtain con75 Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-93 (Powell, J., plurality) (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. 64044 (Powell, J., plurality)); Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-40 (Powell,J., plurality). The Mis-

souri statute required minors under 18 to have parental or judicial consent prior to
having an abortion. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 479. Judicial consent, however, may be
obtained by a showing of emancipation, maturity or in "the best interests of the
minor." Id. at 479-80 n.4, 492 (Powell, J., plurality) (citing Mo.

REV.

STAT.

§ 188.028.2 (Supp. 1982)). Justice Powell noted that in satisfying the Bellotti and
Akron requirements "[a] [sitate's interest in protecting immature minors will sustain

a requirement of a consent substitute either parental or judicial." Id. at 490-91
(Powell, J., plurality).
76 Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987) (per curiam) aff'g, 763 F.2d 1532
(7th Cir. 1985).
77 Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1539-44. The Seventh Circuit enjoined the state statute
and did not determine whether the notification alternatives were constitutional un-

til the Illinois Supreme Court promulgated rules governing appeals and assuring
the minor's confidentiality. Id. The Seventh Circuit recognized, however, that parental notification promoted a significant state interest so long as the state provided

an alternative for mature minors and immature minors whose best interests necessitated obtaining an abortion. Id. at 1537-38.
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traceptives, the state, pursuant to a compelling interest, may impose
reasonable limitations. 78 Thus resolution of the competing interests
depends on whether parental notification is a reasonable limitation
on a minor's freedom to exercise this fundamental right.
VI.

PARENTAL RIGHTS

Parental rights have been recognized and upheld as fundamental in relation to a state's practice of dispensing prescription
contraceptives without mandating parental notification or consent. For example, in Doe v. Irwin 71 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Michigan, both initially (Irwin I)
and on remand (Irwin II), held that the state's distribution of prescription contraceptive devices to minors without the knowledge
or consent of their parents violated the parents' constitutionally
protected rights of privacy (as well as their rights of free exercise
of religion) in the care, control and education of their minor children. o The district court's holding was reversed on appeal, 8 '
and ultimately was denied review by the United States Supreme
Court.8 2 Upon closer examination, however, the district court's
decision is particularly noteworthy because it raises several valid
concerns in relation to parental rights which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit left untouched and
unresolved.
In Irwin I, parents of minor, unemancipated children
brought suit against a state funded family planning center and
county board of health, alleging that the center's practice of distributing contraceptives to minors without parental knowledge
and consent constituted a deprivation of their constitutional
rights and privileges as parents to the care and control of their
children.8 3 Among the clinic's arguments were that the parental
rights did not extend to vetoing a minor's decision to obtain contraceptives; that the minor's right to obtain contraceptives and
family planning program services was constitutionally protected
78 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("the power of the state
to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over

adults".).
79 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich.), vacated and remanded mem., 559 F.2d 1219 (6th
Cir.), on remand, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977), rev'd, 615 F,2d 1162 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980).
80 See Irwin 1, 428 F. Supp. at 1215; Irwin I1, 441 F. Supp. at 1261.

81 615 F.2d at 1162.
82 449 U.S. at 829.
83 Irwin I, 428 F. Supp. at 1200.
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by Danforth; and that the state had a compelling interest in providing the family planning services to minors.84 The district court
characterized the case as "one of first impression [which]
presents a classic confrontation between rights of parents, the
rights of their minor, unemancipated children, the rights of the
family, and the interests of the [s]tate.

'8 5

The court, however, rejected all of the defendants' arguments and concluded that parents had a constitutional right to
participate in their minor children's decisions to either engage in
sexual activity or to assume the medical risks associated with certain contraceptives. Accordingly, the court held that there was
no compelling state interest present, and therefore state regulation could not exclude the parents from participating in "such a
momentous decision." '8 6 The court added that even if the minor
has a fundamental right to obtain contraceptives without parental
consent, this right did not mandate the total exclusion of the parents from receiving notification of the decision. In concluding
that the clinic's practices did not withstand constitutional scrutiny, the court stated that although the state's goal in protecting
the public health and safety may have been well-intended, it was
"not warranted in insinuating [its] way into the delicate relationship between parent and child."8 "
The federal court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, vacated and remanded the Irwin I decision for reconsideration in
light of Carey.88 On remand, the district court in Irwin H reaffirmed and readopted its earlier opinion in Irwin I and held that
Carey fully supported that decision. 9 In its opinion, the district
court examined the Carey decision in its entirety and noted that
there were several factors which distinguished Irwin I from Carey
and which, upon a closer examination, also provided additional
support for the Irwin I holding. In the district court's view, Carey
was a plurality opinion, and therefore not binding as an authoritative decision. Secondly, the statute at issue in Carey prohibited
the distribution of non-prescription as well as prescription contraceptives to minors, while the services in Irwin I extended only
to prescription contraceptives. The court reasoned that Irwin I
did not totally prohibit unemancipated minors from exercising a
Id.
Id. at 1200 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1209-10.
Id.
88 559 F.2d at 1219.
89 Irwin H, 441 F. Supp. at 1261.
84
85
86
87
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right to obtain contraceptives-all that would be required was
"prior parental notification and the opportunity for consultation
before that civil right, which surely implicates the capacity of the
minor, is exercised." 90 Finally, the most important distinction
between Carey and Irwin I lay in the "unusual" nature of Irwin I
where parents, not minors, sought to vindicate their constitutionally recognized rights of privacy in the upbringing of their children, against interference by a publicly operated family planning
clinic. In sum, the district court stated: "Parental authority is plenary. It prevails over the claims of the state, other outsiders, and
the children themselves. There must be some compelling justification for interference.- 9 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling in Irwin II, and held that the
clinic's practice of not notifying the parents of their minor children's decisions to obtain contraceptives did not deprive the parents of their liberty rights.92 Limiting its review to a recognition
of the rights of the parents, the minors, and the state, the court
examined the traditional principles governing the respective
rights and noted that in constitutional precedents involving the
competing interests, the state had either required or prohibited a
particular activity. This "one fundamental difference" led the
court to note that in the Irwin case, there was no compulsory notification requirement or prohibition on parents' participation
which might have impacted on any parental rights. 3
Indeed, the state "merely established a voluntary birth control clinic."9 4 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court
had erroneously interpreted the Carey plurality as creating a parent's constitutional right to notification by clinics distributing
contraceptives to minors. The court concluded that since there
was no unconstitutional interference with parental rights of privacy, there was no need to address the question of a competing
state interest or to weigh the parents' rights against those of minors. Having framed the issue in terms of whether the Constitution required parental knowledge or consent as a condition to a
minor's right to obtain contraceptives, the court, implying a negative response, held that "[i]n the absence of a constitutional requirement for notice to parents, it is clearly a matter for the state
90

Id. at 1260.

91 Id. at 1249.
92

615 F.2d at 1169.

93 Id. at 1168.
94

Id.
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to determine whether such a requirement is necessary or desirable .

. .

. There is no basis for a federal court to impose

conditions in the absence of an overriding constitutional requirement."'9 5 The United States Supreme Court denied the petition

for writ of certiorari.9 6
The final Irwin adjudication leaves several issues unresolved.
For example, the federal court of appeals acknowledged the parents' desire to be informed of their minor children's activities, yet
it failed to address a practical concern noted in the Irwin II opinion: under state law, parents are responsible for the physical
well-being of their children and therefore are required to provide
for care such as medical treatment when necessary.97 If the state,
without parental notice or consent, supplies a minor child with
contraception and the child suffers any of numerous complications associated with use and misuse including, for example,
venereal disease, infection, blood clots, etc., parents are responsible for the care and expense of medical treatment. Similarly, if
pregnancy results, it is ultimately the parents who are responsible
for the medical costs of an abortion or carrying a pregnancy to
term, regardless of whether the state played a role in the
pregnancy.
VII.' A BALANCE OF INTERESTS
Parents seeking to challenge the rights of minors to obtain
access to contraceptive devices without notification undoubtedly
face an uphill battle. Arguably, the most critical invasion of parental privacy rights suffered in cases such as Irwin is the parents'
loss of involvement in their children's upbringing with respect to
the minor's decision to engage in sexual activity. When a state
agency undertakes to provide minor children with contraceptive
devices, it assumes a parens patriae posture and, at least implicitly, sanctions sexual activity, usually in derogation of parental
approval. The fact that a publicly operated clinic provides some
counseling prior to dispensing birth control devices fails to mitigate the fact that a minor's primary caretaker and guardian is effectively denied knowledge and authority in that all-important
aspect of his or her child's upbringing and guidance.
Clinics can argue that a parent seeking involvement in his or
her child's decisions to initiate sexual activity nevertheless will
95 Id. at 1169.

96 449 U.S. 829 (1980).
97 See Irwin 11, 441 F. Supp. at 1252.
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continue to have the opportunity to influence the child with the
same moral and ethical values that would be triggered if the parent were notified. The district court in Irwin II categorically rejected this argument and commented that "[t]he fact that the
defendant surreptitiously interacts with the child and secretly
provides the child with prescriptive, potentially hazardous, contraceptives has the practical result of restricting parents' alternatives both in the exercise of authority in their own households
and of responsibility to direct the rearing of their children." 9 In
short, the Irwin H court noted that while the absence of notification or consent requirements did not prohibit parents from inculcating their moral values upon their children, sole reliance on
such parental initiative unduly burdened the parents in the exercise of their privacy rights. Indeed, a lack of parental notification
and consent requirements unfairly forces the parent to anticipate
a plethora of situations and moral questions which may arise during the course of the child's formative years.
Furthermore, even to the extent that parents should be
aware that their children will be confronting the decision about
sexual involvement, it may be impossible for them to anticipate
exactly when in their children's lives the time is ripe for discussion. For some children it may be as soon as the early teens; for
others the issues are not meaningful at all during their minority.
This, of course, does not undermine parents' ongoing obligation
to provide general guidance and direction as they see fit. Nevertheless, the actions of these clinics in covertly interacting with
children and thereby making it possible for minors to circumvent
parental involvement deprives parents of the opportunity to interact or counteract the clinics' advice at the time that the decisions are made. 9
Finally, the state's involvement may encourage some parents
to avoid confronting the entire issue which they might otherwise
recognize as their responsibility. Parents often have difficulty
discussing sexual activity with their children on a practical and
meaningful level. This does not indicate their lack of desire to
communicate or respond to their children's questions in a positive or constructive manner. Moreover, children themselves may
Id. at 1253.
99 See id. Chief Judge Fox asserted that "so long as [a Title X clinic] continues
to treat children in a manner whereby the parents of those children cannot become
aware of the contact and continues to prescribe potentially hazardous medication
to such children in the absence of notification to their parents, the parental rights
... will continue to be invaded." Id.
98
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desire parental involvement but may be unable to approach their
parents. Thus, by interfering in this delicate relationship, the
state may be depriving both parents and their children of potentially meaningful interactions by encouraging minors to exclude
their parents in their initial decision to engage in sexual activity.
The Supreme Court's rationale in Bellotti, 00 which was subsequently adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Hartigan,'O' is especially persuasive to the extent that it clearly recognizes the state's
interest in promoting parental consultation with a minor who is
considering having an abortion. Deference to the state's interest
in a minor's abortion decision is premised on the minor's presumed inability to make such critical decisions. The state's interest is no less legitimate where a minor decides to engage in
sexual activity. Considerable weight should be given to the fact
that the minor's decision to obtain contraceptives is often the result of peer pressure from youths who arguably are no more
qualified than the minor to make this momentous decision.
When these circumstances are coupled with the reality of serious
medical risks associated with the use of contraceptives, the value
of parental notification is understated. Ostensibly, parental notification might deter minors from obtaining family planning services, thus increasing the risk of unwanted pregnancies. The need
to consider a deterrence factor, however, is obviated by the parents' interest in receiving notification and by the constitutionally
recognized state interest in promoting parental consultation.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The previously discussed judicial opinions reflect the complexity of the issues as well as the numerous interests involved in
a state's attempt to regulate the distribution of contraceptives to
minors. Since sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted teenage pregnancies continue to exist in the forefront of public concerns, it is realistic to expect the state to respond to these
exigencies. States have assumed the responsibility of mandating
sexual education as an integral part of school curricula; some
have opted to take it one step further by allowing public high
schools to sponsor clinics that offer counseling and dispense contraceptives to minors without notifying parents of obtaining their
consent.
There are undoubtedly a number of minors who would be
100 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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better served and counseled by a state funded clinic than by their
own parents. It seems inimical to the principles of parental authority, however, to render these services without the knowledge
or consent of those who have a genuine interest in their minors'
sexual health and development. Yet parents, who desire to protect their interest in preserving family integrity, are at odds with
overwhelming judicial deference to state action in the area of
public health, safety and welfare.
It is clear that the constitution provides that certain family
privacy rights are fundamental. Since the constitution does not
mandate parental notification or consent, it is incumbent upon
the state to promulgate legislation which accommodates the competing rights and interests of the parents, minor children and the
state. While this legislation should consider the mature, emancipated minor's right to privacy, it should also reflect the judicially
recognized state interest in promoting parental consultation as
well as safeguard the parents' constitutional rights in the care,
custody and education of their immature, unemancipated minor
children.

